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-CHINA AND ELECTIONS .... The median voter

median voter theorem. Theorem that in a community in which decisions are taken by majority vote, the outcome of elections tend to be located around the median position in the preferences of different individuals. The theorem is one of the most well-known results of the theory of voting procedures, which explores the formation of collective choice. It assumes that voters have an odd number and that preferences have a single maximum (they are, ie, single-peaked), given these assumptions, it can be shown that the final outcome of the vote will correspond to the voter's preferences for which the 'best alternative is placed in a middle position. This voter, in fact, is what being located in the middle of the frequency distribution of preferences of the community, expresses a position which agrees with the majority of voters. The median voter theorem A community of 5 people must identify the level of public expenditure, currently at zero, but have different opinions on the matter. While the individual wants to cut costs (and therefore prefer the alternative that involves less outlay), the others are in favor of higher levels of collective spending. In particular, the preferences of the five individuals are distributed as follows (in order of increasing amount of the expenditure):

Elector, Alternative, level of expenditure
A,, 10
B, b, 20
C, c, 30
D, d, 40
E, and 50

The alternatives are compared two by two in the first comparison (A versus B), the alternative (which provides a level of public spending to 10) will vote In favor of one individual, while alternative B will vote all those in favor of higher spending levels. If you now compare b with c, will vote in favor of the first alternative A and B, and C will get 3 votes (those of C, D, E). A similar result (3 votes for, 2 against) will be obtained by comparing c with d: the level of public expenditure that entails, in fact, is now considered too high by voters A, B and C. The voter C, then, is that median because of his preference at the number of those who would lower government spending is equal to the number in favor of higher values.

The median voter theorem could also be interpreted as follows .

Once classified the electorate along some dimension, we can expect ragionevomente that voters are distributed in a more or less regularly around a median . The two candidates (or parties, or coalitions) if applicable, posizionatisi left and right of the median will tend to review their positions "toward the center," or rather towards the middle, this being the most numerous of the electoral area "code" while you are losing. The result is that the programs of the two candidates will eventually resemble or be substantially the same.

Classically it is assumed that the distribution of the electorate is describable by a Gaussian (as in Fig.1), but it really is good any distribution (as in Fig.2), subject to clear an area median density of most of the electorate.

Logically, the first candidate who "moves" towards the median gains an advantage (such as candidate S in Fig.3) as unable to acquire increasing amounts of the more "populated" by giving up far less significant share of the "tail". Given that the other candidate (D) will be watching, both candidates will eventually converge median electorate, contending it the most numerically important "center."

course this scheme is more realistic analysis on different levels, provided that the political variables under consideration are at least ordered a sufficiently gradual. It should also be remembered that this is only a conceptual scheme and, therefore, may not accurately represent the reality. Further development of this "model" we can put a clearer division of the electorate with a low density around the median (as for the distribution of Fig.4): it goes without saying that the two candidates will be positioned on the two "peaks", giving greater weight account the "tails" than the "center". This distribution of the electorate justifies the presence of two distinct political agendas for the candidates D and D.

If the most important political issues of interest across the board should the entire electorate, it would start in an increasingly homogeneous distributed around some "shared location": You will move from a distribution of the type so Fig.4, a type distribution Fig.2, to a type distribution Fig.1, D and D candidates you find then no longer on two "peaks" and try to grab the largest "center" in training, such as the "median voter theorem." Eventually the two candidates will aspire to a political program "median" to give the best policy response to the problem that has "shrunk" the electorate, which may well lead to some sort of "union" of two candidates to coordinate policies, make them effective, and save resources from the fight through to the management of consent.